
A Colossal Embroglio:

Control of Amateur Ice Hockey in the United States and the 1948 Olympic Winter Games

Gordon MacDonald

Throughout much of their history, the modern Olympic Games have been the site of struggles involving the issue of amateurism. While champions of amateurism surely believed that they were defending a better, purer way of playing sport, debates about amateurism invariably revealed more fundamental struggles about who should be the authority for various sports. At the 1948 Olympic Winter Games one of these struggles, which had existed for some time, finally became so acrimonious that it threatened the staging of these Games.

Two ice hockey teams under the direction of two competing organizations arrived in Switzerland to compete for the United States in the Winter Games. Under Olympic rules only one would be allowed to complete, but which one? The problem should have been solely a national concern, but because the nation in question was the United States, and because Avery Brundage was involved, it became an issue that soon engulfed the IOC (International Olympic Committee), the Swiss organizers of the Games and the International Ice Hockey Federation (the LIHG-by its French acronym). The case is of interest for several reasons. First, it proved to be important in settling which organization would govern amateur hockey in the United States. Second, it became an example of the transition of hockey in the United States from an amateur system to one based on commercial interests.

On one side of the argument were the czars of amateurism, the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) and the United States Olympic Association (USOA); on the other were businessmen who saw the sport of hockey (including its amateur variant) as a legitimate business enterprise. Second, the case provides us with a glimpse of the influence of the Americans and the USOA (led by Avery Brundage) on the Olympic Games. At the same time, however, other sports groups demonstrated power to the

* Gordon MacDonald is a sessional Faculty member at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.

degree that both Brundage and the IOC found to their surprise that they were unable to force either the Swiss or the LIHG to agree to their demands with respect to the ice hockey tournament.

Background to the Dispute

The roots of the dispute between the two American hockey organizations actually extended to the inter-war period. Beginning in 1931, the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) of the United States organized annual national amateur ice hockey championships (taking over from several organizations that had preceded it).¹ As it did in other sports, the AAU attempted to enforce a strict code of amateurism on the players under its control. For some hockey players and club owners during the 1930s this became problematic because hockey was a popular sport that attracted a paying public. In short, in order to field competitive teams on the ice and at the box office, owners/sponsors of amateur teams (often also the owners of the arenas) paid their better players. This ensured that these players would remain with the owners' teams, and continue playing in their arenas. If the AAU learned, and could prove that this was happening, players and/or teams would be suspended or banned from playing in AAU-sponsored events. Eventually the owners of teams and arenas became irritated enough by the circumstances that they formed their own governing body in 1937, which they called the AHA (Amateur Hockey Association of the United States).² For the next ten years the two organizations (AHA and AAU) organized competing national championships. While the AAU suspended its championships during most of the World War II years, the AHA continued to organize championships throughout the War period.

Relations between the two competing organizations were never amicable for the main reason that, from the moment it was created, the AHA was a threat to the AAU's control of amateur hockey in the United States. As early as 1939 it began to search for international recognition from the LIHG. However, none was forthcoming, and the LIHG members upheld the AAU's membership. (LIHG rules stipulated, as did the rules of most international sports federations, that only one organization per country could be admitted to its membership.) Despite its failure to gain entrance to the LIHG, the AHA's more liberal approach to governing amateur hockey had advocates in other countries. In 1940, disgruntled hockey officials in Canada and Great Britain joined with like-minded Americans to form the International Ice Hockey Association. Created at a time when the hockey world's attention was focused upon greater global issues, the new association never achieved its goal of becoming a rival and possible successor to the LIHG. Shortly after the War, its Canadian and British members reunited with the LIHG, in part because the latter body was beginning to reconsider its stance on amateurism.³ Indeed, when the LIHG met in late August 1946, the Canadian and British members pushed hard for changes to its rules concerning amateurs. The other LIHG members agreed and decided to relax the rules on amateurism. While the AAU did not welcome this decision, it was more disturbed by the Canadians' threat not to participate in the LIHG if the AHA were not allowed membership.⁴ The LIHG considered admitting the AHA in addition to the AAU, but stopped short of contravening its own rules. Instead it gave the AAU an opportunity to change its amateur rules so that they would be aligned with those of the LIHG.⁵

The AAU refused to bow to the LIHG's wishes but, at the same time, recognized its increasingly precarious position in international hockey. Although not happy about it, the AAU came to an agreement with the AHA with respect to the 1947 World Championships in Prague, Czechoslovakia. When an AHA team arrived in Prague, the AAU agreed, grudgingly, to form a joint team to compete in the tournament.⁶ This was a significant concession to the AHA since the AAU was still the official LIHG member in the United States. Yet the fact that the LIHG sanctioned a combined team established a precedent for the events that followed shortly. In Prague, the AHA scored its biggest victory when it applied for and received LIHG recognition as the governing body for ice hockey in the United States.⁷ At the same time, the LIHG also dropped recognition of the hockey forces of the AAU - a bitter pill that the AAUers were loath to swallow.⁸ Recognition by the LIHG was important because it would allow the AHA alone to send a team to the annual world championships. Perhaps more importantly, the IOC recognized the LIHG as the organization in charge of the quadrennial Olympic Winter Games ice hockey tournament. This meant the AHA would have a claim to that competition as well.

Avery Brundage, an AAU member, President of the United States Olympic Association, and Vice-President of the International Olympic Committee, decided to make hockey an issue at the forthcoming Winter Olympics of 1948, where hockey would be an important event. The USOA was the organization recognized by the International Olympic Committee as being responsible for selecting American athletes to compete at Olympic Games. Because the USOA and the AAU were closely affiliated, both in membership and ideologically, the former invariably supported the AAU's cause.



Avery Brundage

Tactically, for Brundage, the Olympic Games were a good terrain on which to fight the battle since he knew that he would be able to bring the IOC into the conflict.

With his influence as IOC vice-president, he felt assured that he would be able to gain the support of the Olympic body in the embroglio involving the AHA. That the dispute amongst the Americans would not be confined to their own country became evident in June 1947 when the Executive Committee of the IOC met with the LIHG in Stockholm to discuss the problem.⁹ The IOC members were encouraged when LIHG representatives agreed to raise the amateur issue at a special congress.¹⁰ In addition, for the 1948 Olympics, representatives of the National Olympic Committees of several major hockey nations agreed to certify only players meeting the IOC's amateur definition.¹¹

However, the IOC's hopes were dashed when the LIHG met in Zurich in September. Its members, including the President, Dr. Fritz Kraatz, decided they were not happy with the agreement signed with the IOC earlier in the year. However, they agreed to abide by the so-called 'Stockholm Amateur Code' for the Olympic tournament. Also, at its request, they reiterated their support for their new affiliate, the AHA, and stated that only it could send a team to the Olympic tournament.¹²

Pre-Olympic Posturing

Throughout 1947 the AAU\USOA and the AHA were unable to reach any compromise solution concerning the Olympic Games. Indeed, on the one hand, why should the AHA be concerned since it was now recognized by the LIHG? In fact, it did have one real problem with regard to the Olympics. That is, according to Olympic rules, its entry for the Games needed to be signed by the USOA before being forwarded to the Swiss organizers. The USOA, being composed mostly of AAUers, would not do this and said so publically on several occasions.¹³ Hence, the AHA did have reason to keep the lines of communication open. (This problem was also the reason why it had asked the LIHG to reconfirm it as the organization that would be allowed to participate in the Olympic tournament.) Obviously, on the other hand, the USOA was interested in reaching some sort of an agreement since it was promoting the AAU which was not recognized by the LIHG.

Privately, correspondence between AAU and USOA members during the latter part of 1947 revealed that they recognized their weak position internationally. AAU member John Hutchinson asked Brundage in November if he were continuing his attempts to gain support internationally for the AAU position. He also wanted support for an AAU team that could attend the Games, "regardless of the status of things."¹⁴ Brundage was pessimistic in his reply, stating that he was still trying but that it was "doubtful that entry of [a] USOA team will be accepted."¹⁵ Brundage also wrote to several AAU members about their organization's poor record of support of hockey in the United States, citing a 'letter from Europe' that said AAU teams tended to be weak and poorly equipped, whereas AHA teams were well represented. He even admitted, in a moment of candor, that the USOA, too, was partly to blame for the AHA successes.¹⁶

Nonetheless, late in 1947, the USOA decided to increase the stakes in the dispute. Early in December its members voted to consider an American boycott of the Games if the AHA team was allowed to participate.¹⁷ This provoked a counter-threat from the mayor of St. Moritz to withdraw as host of the Games. In addition, LIHG

President, Dr. Kraatz, responded that his organization would both confirm the AHA invitation and ignore the USOA threat.¹⁸

As it became clear that the USOA was alone in its position, Brundage took steps to form a team acceptable to AAU rules.¹⁹ This was despite the fact that both the Swiss and the LIHG resolutely refused to change their position. Before the USOA and AAU could accomplish this task, the AHA named the team that it would send to the Olympic Winter Games. Though he knew in advance they would be rejected, Walter Brown of the AHA forwarded the names of the players to the USOA for approval anyway.²⁰ Even after this event, however, there must have been some hope for a compromise between the factions because, in its Christmas Day edition, the *New York Times* reported that the AHA and the AAU/USOA had held another unsuccessful conference.²¹ Frustrated, the USOA again threatened to withdraw from the Games. Gustavus Kirby, the president emeritus of the USOA, even made an impassioned plea to the IOC to step in and bar the AHA team.²²



Walter Brown

As the debate continued, the AAU and USOA attacked the AHA in public forums, such as the *New York Times*, with commentary concerning the professionalism of the players and owners and how they would sully the purity of the Olympics with their presence. This can be seen in an AAU commentary on the AHA that appeared in the New Year's Day edition of the *New York Times* in 1948. AAU secretary-treasurer, Daniel Ferris, issued a four page pamphlet condemning the AHA for its professionalism. He also blamed the British and the Canadians for conspiring to have the AAU removed from the LIHG the previous year. While Ferris admitted that the AAU had lost access to some of the more desirable arenas (because of its dispute with the AHA²³), he still argued that the issue was not one of the control of amateur hockey. Rather, he asked, "...will amateur sports survive the encroachments of commercial interests?"²⁴ The underlying theme behind this question was whether amateur hockey as controlled by the AAU would survive the encroachment of competing

organizations such as the AHA. If not, then control of hockey would move elsewhere. Hence, the AAU members were frustrated over how control of a major sport was slipping from their grasp.

Beyond the domestic front, the USOA continued to make statements that angered hockey people outside of the U.S.A. Early in January 1948 the USOA reiterated its threat to withdraw the entire American Olympic team. As before, LIHG representatives reacted strongly and negatively, stating that their federation would boycott the Games and take the tournament elsewhere if the AHA team were barred.²⁵ This latter threat was one that the Swiss Organizing Committee truly feared because hockey tournament ticket sales would be a major source of revenue for the Games. As time ran out before the Games, the U.S. organizations were unable to reach a compromise, despite some last minute negotiations between Brundage and AHA vice-president Walter Brown.²⁶ In effect, however, these negotiations were more a formality than anything else since both hockey teams were already in Europe.

AT ST. MORITZ



St. Moritz - 1948

As was its custom, the IOC Executive Committee met prior to the Games. Because of the presence of the two American ice hockey teams in St. Moritz, this item topped its agenda. During the afternoon of January 28, the Executive Committee argued at length about what should be done. In the end, the members voted that neither of the two teams should be allowed to compete since there were 'irregularities' in their entries.²⁷ In a technical sense this was probably correct. That is, the AAU/USOA team would not have been eligible because it was not affiliated with the LIHG. Furthermore, it had forwarded its entry to the Swiss after the deadline to do so had

passed. The AHA, as mentioned earlier, did not have its entry signed by the USOA because of the latter's refusal to do so.²⁸

There is evidence to suggest that Brundage would have been quite satisfied to have both teams barred. The *Toronto Star* had reported nearly two weeks previously that Brundage believed this to be the best course of action. He also admitted that the amateur status of players on both teams was suspect.²⁹ Furthermore, some of the players on the USOA team later reflected that their chances of playing in the tournament were not great and suggested that Brundage's real aim was to use them as pawns in his battle to remove the AHA team from the Games.³⁰

The IOC's Executive Committee was not prepared for the Swiss reaction to their edict. Shortly after the EC decision, the Swiss released their own statement that they would ignore the IOC ruling.³¹ The EC members were astounded and furious at the impertinence of the Swiss. The issue became the main point of discussion the following day at a meeting of the full session of the IOC. The members argued vociferously about the issue. Interestingly, not all believed that the Swiss were in the wrong about the original registration of the AHA team, arguing that they had followed appropriate procedures and were now being blamed for a weakness in Olympic rules. Brundage defended the USOA's position rather melodramatically, saying it would be the end of that organization if the IOC ruled in favour of the AHA team. After several hours of this sort of debate, the members voted on two proposals - 1) that neither team should compete, or 2) that the AHA team should participate. (Obviously, there was little support for the AAU team.) Sixteen of the members supported the first proposal while only ten supported the second one.³²



The IOC Executive Board Convenes in St. Moritz

As they had with the EC decision the day previously, the Swiss refused to accept this new dictum, prompting press headlines such as 'Simon Purists Scuttled, Long Live Hockey Pros!' in the *Toronto Star*.³³ A more staid paper such as the *Times* of London did not carry such sensational headlines but its commentary chastised the Americans for their handling of the whole situation.³⁴

Realizing that the Swiss had called its bluff, the IOC appointed a committee of three members (Lord Burghley, Sid Dawes, and Bo Eklund) to commence negotiations with the LIHG and its president Dr. Kraatz in an attempt to reach a compromise. These three committee members suggested to Kraatz that the tournament not be called Olympic. He refused and threatened to move the tournament to Zurich if the IOC took that step. This placed the onus upon the IOC to make a decision on its own. In the early morning hours of January 30, after hours of acrimonious debate, the IOC acquiesced and, while not endorsing the AHA team, decided not to prevent the Swiss from allowing it to play.^{3 5} However, the skirmishing was not yet over.

The Games Commence

The St. Moritz Olympic Winter Games opened on the morning of January 30. Though they were not going to play in the hockey tournament, the members of the AAU/USOA hockey team marched into the stadium with the rest of the American athletes for the ten o'clock start. The members of the AHA team watched from the spectator grandstands. Of course the AHA team members had other things on their minds since they were to play in the first game of the tournament at eleven o'clock in the morning, immediately after the conclusion of the opening ceremonies. While the situation of the two hockey teams was bizarre, the presence of the rest of the U.S. team was a clear indication that Brundage had been bluffing about boycotting.



Bibi Torriani, Swiss hockey captain, orates the Olympic oath

Though the hockey tournament was obviously going to take place, the IOC was not going to let the issue rest without exacting punishment on someone. After hearing that the LIHG would not accept the idea of calling the tournament something other than "Olympic," the members again debated what action they could take. This time they decided to call the LIHG's bluff and voted: 1) not to consider the tournament

Olympic, 2) to protest to the Swiss for allowing the AHA team to participate and, 3) that they would withdraw recognition of the LIHG as the international federation governing hockey.³⁶ This decision prompted a protest from the LIHG as well as more criticism in the international press.³⁷ The *Toronto Star* reported that Kraatz was determined to have the tournament continue and that his organization would consider it Olympic despite the IOC decision.³⁸ The *Times* stated that the situation was 'absurd' and that the teams and the sporting public were tired of the squabble.³⁹



Team AHA (dark shorts) lose 5-4 to Bronze Medalist Swiss Team

Indeed, the antagonists themselves appeared to be growing tired of the problem. After the IOC made its last proclamation, the issue actually became quiet for nearly a week, at least in the IOC's official minutes and in the international press. Then, on February 5, the Swiss organizers met again with the IOC Executive Committee in an effort to resolve the issue once and for all. After an extended meeting in which both sides defended their position vigorously, and at times viciously, they managed to reach an agreement. The hockey tournament, which by this point was nearly over, would be considered 'Olympic' but the results of the games in which the AHA team played would not count in the final standings. This effectively placed the AHA team outside of the tournament.⁴⁰ (Incidentally, some of the AHA team members were quick to point out that they believed that by the time the IOC decision was announced, their team was no longer in contention for a medal anyway.⁴¹) The full session of the IOC ratified this decision the next day. The IOC members also decided that their severance of relations with the LIHG should be delayed until February 9 - the day after the Games closed.⁴² The members simply refused to let the LIHG defy their position and not support them on the issue.

Attempts to Resolve the Impasse

While the banishment of the LIHG put the status of hockey for future Winter Olympics in a tenuous situation, four years would pass before the next Games and this was enough time for the IOC and the LIHG to reconsider their positions. Indeed, as early as the IOC's annual session in 1949, calls were made for the return of hockey to the Olympic program.⁴³ The Norwegians, by this time preparing to host the 1952 Winter Games, were particularly interested in having the IOC make a decision as quickly as possible. Their IOC member pressured IOC president Sigfrid Edström to return hockey to the Games. The aging president, who did not want to readmit the LIHG, was uncertain about what to do. He consulted Brundage who counseled him to remain firm in opposing the LIHG.⁴⁴ To this, Edström suggested that a possible alternative would be a new International Federation for hockey that would deal solely with the amateurs. He asked if Brundage could convince the AAU to take the lead in the formation of such a body.⁴⁵ In fact, the Americans were already considering just such a possibility. The USOA asked members of its hockey committee to approach their contacts in Europe in an attempt to convince amateur organizations there to consider joining a new body.⁴⁶ For its part, the AAU promoted its own suggestion to deal with the impasse. It suggested the creation of a Hockey Control Board to be formed of nine AHA, six AAU, and five National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) representatives.⁴⁷ This plan was of little interest to the AHA since it would not have a majority vote and the proposal included the proviso that players be registered under AAU eligibility rules. Hence, the proposal died.

In 1950, despite his misgivings about the LIHG, Brundage agreed with his fellow IOC members that they should extend an olive branch. Hence, the IOC issued a statement that it would be ready to consider welcoming the LIHG back since it believed the latter had changed its rules so they would be in accord with those of the IOC.⁴⁸ (This was an interesting statement since there was some question as to whether the LIHG's rules were not in accordance with Olympic rules in the first place.) The IOC delegated several of its members to contact LIHG representatives in order to discuss the possibility of having hockey return to the Games. Dr Kraatz, upon hearing of this plan, suggested to the IOC that its Executive Board and the Council of the LIHG should meet late in the summer of 1950.⁴⁹ Brundage, who did not trust Kraatz, was not optimistic about the possible success of such a meeting, given the entrenched positions of both the LIHG and the AAU/USOA with respect to the AHA. Other IOC members were less pessimistic. Upon hearing of the proposed meeting, Canadian IOC member Sid Dawes suggested that the readmission of hockey should be considered independently of the problem in the United States.⁵⁰

On August 26, 1950, representatives of the IOC and the LIHG met in Bern, Switzerland. They drafted a recommendation that hockey should return to the Winter Games in Oslo.⁵¹ When Edström and Brundage saw the draft the following day, they were opposed to certain portions. In particular, Brundage was opposed to the statement that NOCs 'would not refuse to sign the entries' provided that the LIHG had certified their amateur status. If this were to be the case, then the USOA would inevitably have to sign the entries forwarded by the AHA. Despite the continued differences between the two sides, Brundage agreed to remain in Switzerland for a couple

of weeks in order to meet with AHA vice-president Walter Brown, who was also traveling in Europe. Surprisingly, they were able to reach an agreement when they met on September 10.⁵² Brundage agreed to recommend to the hockey committee of the USOA that a new, joint committee be formed. Composed of four representatives of the AHA and four of the AAU/USOA, the committee would be in charge of selecting a team, coach, and manager for the Olympics.⁵³

Brundage soon found, however, that his colleagues in the USOA hockey committee did not like the idea of giving up their major responsibility. The hockey committee met late in September. After hearing that their attempts to promote an alternative international federation for hockey had failed totally, the members discussed Brundage's proposal but could not reach a consensus whether to accept or reject it.⁵⁴ Failing at the committee level, USOA secretary-treasurer Asa Bushnell presented it to the Executive Board of the USOA in November.⁵⁵ That failed as well because the Board wanted a permanent solution to the problem. Brundage was not prepared to give up on the idea so he presented it to the Executive Board again in February 1951 with the promise that a short-term solution was a key step towards resolving the issue permanently.⁵⁶ This time the Board accepted the idea. The accord was announced on February 22, 1951, less than a year before the Oslo Games.⁵⁷

Shortly thereafter, Sigfrid Edström wrote to the members of the IOC Executive Committee to inform them that relations had been restored with the LIHG and hockey would be a part of the program for Oslo. Later in the spring, the LIHG joined other international sports federations in a meeting with the IOC Executive Committee, whereupon it rejoined the Olympic 'family'.⁵⁸ Brundage himself welcomed the LIHG representative to the meeting. Thus, although the IOC and LIHG members had decided by the middle of 1950 that a reconciliation was in the best interest of both parties, the influence of the situation in the United States delayed any announcements until after it had been resolved.

Conclusions

Although the IOC refused to allow the AHA team's results to be included in the 1948 Olympic Winter Games ice hockey tournament, the fact that the team was allowed to compete was a significant victory for the AHA over the AAU and USOA in terms of legitimizing its position as the dominant amateur hockey organization in the United States. For the AAU, the loss of control over hockey was symbolic of a broader erosion of its control over amateur sport, erosion that would continue throughout the decades following the Second World War. Indeed, it is worth noting that AAU-sponsored national championships for amateur hockey ceased after the 1948 season. This marked the end of a period of some seventeen years of AAU-sponsored national amateur championships. It, too, was a further indication of the decline of AAU influence over amateur hockey. The AHA continued to hold national amateur championships into the mid-1950s. At that time it discontinued them, although it did hold championships at lower levels and continued to dominate amateur hockey in the United States into the 1960s.⁵⁹

With respect to the 1948 Olympic Winter Games, it is noteworthy, though, that had Brundage not underestimated the determination of the Swiss and the LIHG, neither of the American teams would not have participated in the Games. Undoubtedly,

this would have weakened the AHA's position, while re-strengthening that of the AAU in the United States, at least with respect to Olympic hockey.

At another level, that the struggle between the two U.S. organizations even reached, and then engulfed, the other organizations involved with the Winter Olympics gives insight into the power and influence of the USOA and its leader Avery Brundage. By encouraging the formation of the AAU/USOA team, which he appears to have known would not be allowed to play, Brundage showed the length to which he was prepared to go in order to promote his position. In the end, though, the Swiss concerns over revenue won out over the IOC's concern about a strict amateurism and, more importantly, its own authority. The IOC members, and particularly the leaders, though angry about their bruised egos, were pragmatic enough to realize that the Swiss needed the financial revenue that hockey would bring to the Games. Although IOC members always spoke of the importance of the amateur ideal and how it should be upheld by Olympic competitors, when they were faced with a potential threat to the staging of the Games, questions about amateur ideals took a back seat to ensuring that the Games would go on.

Endnotes

1. Frank G. Menke, *The Encyclopedia of Sports* (Fourth Revised Edition) Revisions edited by Roger Treat (South Brunswick and New York: A.S. Barnes and Company 1969) 644-645.
2. *Ibid.*
3. In 1946, the LIHG held meetings in Zurich, Switzerland. The AAU representative, Bill Greims, reported on the meeting to Avery Brundage in a letter written on September 1. Greims stated that "Amateurism was not considered, only the good of ice hockey and it was stated that since the war amateurism must be modified." Letter from Bill Greims to Avery Brundage, 1 September 1946, *The Avery Brundage Collection*, Box 216 (hereafter cited as the ABC). *The Avery Brundage Collection, 1908-1975* is housed at the University of Illinois Archives. A microfilm copy is held by the International Centre for Olympic Studies (hereafter cited as ICOS) at The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada. The microfilm copy was used for this paper.
4. The Canadian advocacy for the AHA was based upon the fact that the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association (CAHA) and the AHA had established relations with respect to players. Furthermore, their approaches to governing amateur hockey were similar. For its part, the AAU charged that the AHA and the CAHA were becoming mostly feeder leagues for overtly professional leagues, in particular, the National Hockey League. This latter point was reasonably accurate, at least with respect to the CAHA, as Bruce Kidd points out in his volume *The Struggle for Canadian Sport* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 226. The AAU's position on the AHA and CAHA was supported by some Europeans. Andre Poplimont, one-time president of the LIHG, stated that the AHA supported the CAHA financially and that the latter was also a farm system for the latter. Statement by Andre Poplimont on the Hockey Situation, December 1947,

ABC, Box 34, Reel 20.

5. Letter from Bill Greims to Avery Brundage, 1 September 1946. Greims warned Brundage of the strong opinions of the LIHG members about the amateurism issue. He noted that "If we wish to retain our membership this action [rule change] will be necessary in December [time of AAU meeting]." Furthermore, he suggested that the AAU would have to reach some sort of accommodation with the AHA.
6. After much bickering, the managers of the two teams agreed to combine them, and the LIHG accepted the compromise for the 1947 tournament. "U.S. Sextets Merged," *New York Times*, February 15, 1947, p.12.
7. "International Hockey Group Drops AAU and Accepts AHA as U.S. Representatives," *New York Times*, February 23, 1947, V, p. 1, 6. The decision came after an acrimonious five hour debate at the Congress of the LIHG held during and after the 1947 World Championships.
8. It is important to note that this action did not pass through the LIHG unopposed. In fact, the former president of the LIHG, Andre Poplimont, was so angered at the way the decision was made that he resigned from the LIHG. Statement by Andre Poplimont on the Hockey Situation, December 1947.
9. Wolf Lyberg, *Fabulous 100 Years of the IOC* (Lausanne, Switzerland: The International Olympic Committee, 1996), p. 95.
10. "Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session," Stockholm, June 19,21, 1947, ABC, Box 90. The results of the meeting with the LIHG are included in Annex 8.
11. Ibid.
12. "Minutes of the Meeting of the LIHG," Zurich, September 6-8, 1948, ABC, Box 216.
13. Brundage stated on numerous occasions that the USOA would not sign entries of an AHA team. See, for example, *New York Times*, February 23, 1947, V, p.1, 6; September 4, 1947, p. 35; December 4, 1947, p. 47.
14. Letter from John Hutchinson to Avery Brundage, November 5, 1947, ABC, Box 216.
15. Letter from Avery Brundage to John Hutchinson, November 11, 1947, ABC Box 216.
16. Letter from Avery Brundage to Daniel Ferris, Willard Greims, J. Lyman Bingham, Harry Hainsworth, and John Hutchinson, November 15, 1947, ABC, Box 216. The AAU's lack of support for hockey had contributed to its downfall within the LIHG as well.

17. "American Withdrawal From Winter Olympics Threatened," *New York Times*, December 4, 1947, p. 47.
18. "St. Moritz Threat to Withdraw as Host Perils Winter Olympics," *New York Times*, December 5, 1947, p. 35. Needless to say the Swiss organizing committee dismissed the mayor's claims, stating that if the United States stayed home, there would simply be one less nation to compete in the Games. It is also worth noting that Kraatz was Swiss and a member of the organizing committee in addition to his duties as president of the LIHG.
19. "Ice Hockey Debate is Called Impasse," *New York Times*, December 3, 1947, p. 42.
20. Letter from Walter Brown to Asa Bushnell, November 28, 1947, ABC, Box 156. Letter from Asa Bushnell to Walter Brown, December 3, 1947, ABC, Box 216.
21. "Negotiations Fail in Hockey Dispute," *New York Times*, December 25, 1947, p. 35.
22. "Kirby Appeal Hits AHA Acceptance," *New York Times*, December 31, p. 20.
23. As mentioned earlier, AHA executives were often owners or operators of arenas and rinks. Part of their strategy to weaken the AAU was to bar its teams from using their facilities.
24. "Ferris is Bitter Attacking AHA," *New York Times*, January 1, 1948, p. 31.
25. *Toronto Star*, January 7, 1948, p. 11. This Swiss organizing committee also reiterated its support for the AHA team, noting that it had accepted that body on September 7 and November 16, 1947. Letter from Marcel Hennigar to Avery Brundage January 2, 1948, ABC, Box 156.
26. *New York Times*, January 23, 1948, p. 30. The report that formed the basis of this article was filed from the ocean liner *Queen Mary*. Brundage and the vice-president of the AHA, Walter Brown, were both on board as they traveled to Europe for the Games. They avoided each other for five days on the crossing but finally met at the urging of a U.S. figure skating judge. Although both men said their meeting had been amicable, they were completely unable to reach an agreement. Brundage was cited as saying that 'A showdown will have to come, and it might as well come now as anytime.'
27. "Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Committee," St Moritz, January 27-28, 1948, ABC, Box 90. See also, *IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Vol. I, 1921-1948*, Translations and Summaries by Wolf Lyberg. A copy of these summaries is held by the ICOS.
28. Wolf Lyberg claims that the AHA entry did have all the proper signatures and documentation - but admits that he does not know how this could have happened given the USOA's position. See Lyberg, *Fabulous 100 Years of the IOC*, 96.

29. *Toronto Star*, January 17, 1948, p. 12 as well as January 22, 1948, p. 16.
30. In 1991 *Sports Illustrated* did a feature on the 1948 hockey controversy. Based mostly on coverage of the events in the *New York Times* and interviews with surviving members of the team, the article states that some of the players realized that they would not likely play. However, some were willing to go because it would give them a holiday in Europe. See John Powers, "How They Spent Their Winter Vacation," *Sports Illustrated*, Vol. 75, No. 26, December 16, 1991, n.p. The press at the time also reported on the USOA team's anger at feeling used. See, for example, "Avery's Blunder an \$18,000 Beauty!" *Toronto Star*, February 5, 1948, p. 18; as well as, "Idle Hockey Players Hit U.S. Olympic Body; Say They Were 'Fall Guys' for Committee," *New York Times*, February 1, 1948, V, p. 1.
31. The international press reported these events with varying amounts of commentary. See, for example, the *Times*, January 29, 1948 p. 2f; "Both U.S. Teams Barred From Olympic Hockey; Swiss Group Defies Ruling," *New York Times*, January 29, 1948, p. 30; and "Swiss Innkeepers Howl and Veto Union's Edict!" *Toronto Star*, January 29, 1948, p. 18.
32. "Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session, St. Moritz, January 29, 1948, ABC, Box 90. See also *IOC General Session Minutes, Volume III, 1948-1955*, Translations and Summaries by Wolf Lyberg. Copy held by the ICOS.
33. "Simon Purists Scuttled Long Live Hockey Pros!" *Toronto Star*, January 30, 1948, p. 14.
34. See, for example, the *Times*, January 28, 1948, p. 2g. "What looks like a family quarrel surely could have been settled at home," sniffed the correspondent in this article.
35. See Lyberg, *Fabulous 100 Years of the IOC*, 97. Also, the *New York Times* reported on the acrimonious meeting, noting that IOC President Sigfrid Edström's loud voice could be heard from behind the closed doors of the suite in the Hotel Kulm. "AHA Plays Swiss to Open Olympics Today With Hockey Feud Compromised," *New York Times*, January 30, p. 26.
36. "Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session," St. Moritz, January 30, 1948, ABC, Box 90.
37. *Toronto Star*, January 31, 1948, p. 1-2.
38. *Toronto Star*, February 2, 1948, p. 2.
39. *The Times*, February 2, 1948, p. 6b.
40. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Commission with the Swiss Olympic Committee Interview Delegation," St. Moritz, February 5, 1948, Box 90.

41. "Brundage Throws his Smear Ball at AHA Boys," *Toronto Star*, February 7, 1948, p. 14.
42. "Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session," St. Moritz, February 6-8, 1948, ABC, Box 90.
43. "Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session," Rome, April 24-28, 1949, ABC, Box 90.
44. See Letter from Sigfrid Edström to Avery Brundage, December 5, 1949, and Letter from Avery Brundage to Sigfrid Edström, December 16, 1949, ABC, Box 236.
45. Letter from Sigfrid Edström to Avery Brundage, December 20, 1949, ABC, Box 236.
46. See, for example, Letter from Daniel Ferris to John 'Donna' Fox, January 16, 1950, ABC, Box 236. Fox was a member of the USOA living in Italy. Ferris asked him to try to convince the Italians to consider joining a new body which might be formed at the Oslo Olympic Winter Games in 1952.
47. "Hockey Board Proposed," *New York Times*, September 30, 1949, 31.
48. "Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Session," Copenhagen, May 15-17, 1950, ABC, Box 76. Brundage helped to draft the statement. There are handwritten drafts of the statement contained within the Brundage Collection in a file devoted to the topic of the hockey conflict. File on AAU- AHA conflict, ABC, Box 236.
49. Letter from Fritz Kraatz to Otto Mayer, June 6, 1950, ABC, Box 236. Otto Mayer was chancellor of the IOC at that time.
50. Letter from Sid Dawes to Albert Mayer, August 14, 1950, ABC, Box 236. Albert Mayer was a Swiss IOC member and a brother to the chancellor Otto.
51. Meeting of IOC and LIHG officials in Bern, August 26, 1950, ABC, Box 236.
52. Meeting of Avery Brundage and Walter Brown, September 10, 1950, ABC, Box 236.
53. Ibid.
54. Meeting of the Ice Hockey Committee of the USOA, September 22, 1950, ABC, Box 236.
55. A. Bushnell informed Walter Brown of his failure in a letter on December 11, 1950. Letter from Asa Bushnell to Walter Brown, December 11, 1950, ABC, Box 236.
56. Brundage wrote to members of the USOA Executive Board with his suggestions

concerning the hockey issue on February 9, 1951. Letter from Avery Brundage to the Executive Board of the USOA, February 9, 1951, ABC, Box 236.

57. "Accord is Reached in Hockey Dispute," *New York Times*, February 22, 1951, p. 37.
58. "Minutes of the Meeting of the EC of the IOC with the International Sports Federations," Vienna, May 4-5, 1951, ABC, Box 76.
59. Frank G. Menke, *The Encyclopedia of Sports*, 644-645.