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Olympic Sport, Global Media, and Cultural Diversity

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Imagine a city in which the dominant culture is an international one, in which the most visible public institutions are corporations, and the most meaningful signifiers of personal and collective identity are brand loyalties and affinities of tastes and 'interests'. The crowd downtown is affluent looking and racially heterogeneous, while the landscape is a familiar pastiche of upmarket shopping spaces and global commodity-signs. In this panorama of prosperity, ethnicity and place, identities are barely visible except as cuisine and 'heritage', souvenirs of a past where race and territory coincided more closely and more exclusively. This, I want to suggest, is the panorama of our "world class" cities, wherever they are, cities in which the same kinds of global culture and other "world class" products are on display and where this itself is celebrated as a triumph of globalization, cosmopolitanism, and consumer sovereignty.

The intention here is to unpack the often unexamined meanings of the concept "world class", and to offer some critical, even curmudgeonly thoughts on the vision and the values associated with it. I will argue that globalization is a business-led agenda, the effect of which is to create global markets for products which may be very good, but whose popular consumption - especially in the case of cultural products like sports or music or film - helps to standardize cultures that were once distinctive. In sport, globalization has seen the integration of many developing or postcolonial nations into the Olympic Games and soccer's World Cup, making them into events that attract massive and worldwide interest. It has also seen the construction of global audiences for games like soccer, basketball, rugby, and golf; and one outcome of this has certainly been to open up new possibilities in sporting interests and broaden the range of spectator choices, especially on television. However the corollary has been the 'delocalization' of sporting cultures, and a convergence between the promotion of sports themselves, and the use of sports to promote other (global) consumer products and brand names.'

In what follows, I will begin with a critique of what Peter Donnelly has called "prolympism."[2] I will argue here that in their modern partnership with global commerce, and in the ideological and material celebration of 'winners' that follows almost inevitably from sponsors' commercial interests, the Olympic Games have lost some - if not yet all - of the ideological and moral significance that used to distinguish them from other world championships in professional sports, notably soccer's World Cup. I will argue that the normative legitimation of the calculating pursuit of victory (what Harry Webb long ago called the professionalization of attitudes) that now characterizes any global sports event where being a 'winner' translates into enormous financial rewards has served to strip "world class" sports of the

ethical significance that sport once claimed, and that the differences between the Olympic sports and most professional sports in this regard are no longer meaningful. I will further argue that the systematic and scientific pursuit of victory that is sponsored by government 'sport systems', in Canada and many other countries, has also led to a standardization of what used to be historical differences in preparation, tactics, and national styles, Together, these tendencies mean that even though spectators still thrill to the accomplishments of outstanding individuals and teams, international sport today (in almost every sport, from soccer to cycling) is increasingly a monoculture, featuring "programmed bodies" and sponsors who demand results. It is a culture from which spontaneity and playfulness have been drained, and in which tales of abuse have become all too familiar.

The concluding section of the paper seeks to situate the globalization of sport within broader campaigns to reconstruct the citizens of actual places as global consumers, and to celebrate consumer identities. It will be suggested that global sports and entertainment corporations, just like global corporations in other industries or services, seek to build markets for global brand names precisely by weakening loyalties to the local. They do this by building name recognition, by associating these names (whether product names or the names of stars) with 'excellence', and by associating the taste for global products with cosmopolitanism and cultural sophistication. The paper attempts to deconstruct what is meant by "world class" in this and other promotional discourse, and it advocates for the continuing importance of cultural diversity, where this includes diversity in sporting practices, and in the values and agendas that are publicly associated with sports and physical activities.

Prolympism: The Widening World of High Performance Sport

Donnelly coined the term 'prolympism' to describe how, over the final quarter of the twentieth century, what were historically two alternative structures of sporting meaning and practice - Olympism and professionalism - have coalesced into a single dominant culture of sport. Elite, 'high performance', sport has become a global norm, he suggests, as the Olympics have become big business and audiences everywhere have become accustomed to the norms and values of professionalism. For more than half a century, of course, the Olympic movement stood for a different set of ideals, and in many countries, amateur sports governing bodies that were affiliated with the Olympic movement fought rearguard actions, both to sustain the place of amateur sports in public culture, and to popularize the Olympic ideals and ideology. Central to the latter was the idea that participation was more important than winning, and that sport was an inherently valuable activity that offered important benefits to participants even when played badly. I'm aware, of course, that the opposition in principle to any form of payment for sporting excellence was turned, in too many quarters, into rationalizations for social exclusion. However, the Olympic ideals as I understood them historically, offered a coherent set of values in which non-elite participation was *more* important than the elitism of skill, and in which sportsmanship - meaning respect for opponents and for the rules that make sports meaningful - was more important than winning.

Donnelly also observes that, in sport, professionalism never became an ideological agenda (as it did in other fields of formerly amateur or volunteer endeavour), let alone a set of ideals. However over the course of the twentieth century, in a whole succession of sports (from team games early in the century, to skiing and athletics in more recent years), professionalism has gradually pushed amateur competitions and organizations into the background. This has happened as professional athletes in many sports have normalized standards of performance that are no longer achievable by part-time athletes. As the public has become accustomed to these standards, in mm, and as audiences have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to pay to see famous performers, spectator sports have become big business. The money that pro athletes can make has risen exponentially, and professional athletes have largely pushed their amateur counterparts out of the news. At the same time, though, given the stakes involved when winners are so richly rewarded, professional athletes have also gradually normalized the practice of doing whatever is necessary to win, whether this means 'professional fouls' in soccer or ice hockey, or altering the body through performance enhancing drugs (in many sports).

Over the last thirty years, of course, more and more Olympic sports have become effectively professionalized, and standards have risen markedly. Murray Halberg, the Auckland milkman who won athletics gold at 5000m in 1960, would likely not make the finals were he to run the same time today. This improvement in standards has been partially accomplished by the spread of state-sponsored sport systems, once the preserve of East Bloc nations (and widely attacked in the West). Today, countries like Canada, Australia, and most western European nations invest substantial sums in trying to win medals in international sport, especially in the Olympic Games. Some of this is investment in facilities. However the biggest difference from the 1960s is financial support systems designed to allow elite athletes in the Olympic sports to train and compete on a full time basis (i.e. to be professional athletes), and to systematize their training according to the latest knowledge in the sport sciences (exercise physiology, biomechanics, sport psychology, and sport medicine).

Both have contributed to the growth of a culture of professionalism, even in sports where pay and endorsement income are not yet significant.

This has meant that 'world class' athletes of today are bigger, faster, and especially stronger than their predecessors; often manifesting the 'programmed' bodies depicted in John Hoberman's *Mortal Engines.*[3] It has also led to the rationalization of amateur sports in many countries: to talent identification and development systems, to the concentration of resources on elite athletes, and to an emphasis on outcomes rather than process (i.e. on medals, rather than 'personal bests', let alone enjoyment). All of this has undoubtedly pushed back frontiers of human achievement and increased performance 'standards', sometimes dramatically. However as new standards have become norms, the corollary of these advances is that too often, the improvisational spirit that is at the heart of both play and flair is subordinated to athleticism and to risk minimizing tactical systems. The result, for Uruguayan historian Eduardo Galeano, is that "professional soccer, ever more rapid, ever less beautiful, has become a game of speed and strength, fuelled by the fear of losing."[4] Moreover, since sport science and defensive tactics can be taught more readily than skill or flair, and since knowledge of them is now global, the differences in style that once distinguished Latin American soccer from European, or Canadian hockey from Russian, are also steadily being erased. And in many of the Olympic sports, too, the incentives to win are now so great that playfulness, enjoyment of the body, and sportsmanship are giving way to work rate, discipline, and tactical gamesmanship.

This 'results-orientation' is now manifest in many sports and in many countries, but to me it was made explicit in the assumptions and targets that were articulated in the report of a 1988 Canadian Task Force on National Sport Policy. After observing that Canadians "should see some progress with the basic question, 'What does it cost to be number one in the world in sport X?'", the Report goes on to propose that Canada should aim to place "among the three leading Western sporting nations (with West Germany and the USA) in the 1992 Summer Olympics", and ... "first as a nation in the 1990 Commonwealth Games."[5] Although observers from abroad might be struck by the presumption of the targets, what is even more remarkable here is the 'basic question' that is asked with all seriousness. In sociological terms, what is illustrated here is precisely what Habermas calls technocratic consciousness, where technical and bureaucratic professionals simply take for granted the legitimacy of "presupposed system goals", without stopping to consider whether at some point these system goals might violate larger ethical or political considerations.[6] This is why, despite official sanctions against drug use in the Olympics and in many professional sports, drug use in sport remains common and offenders are treated with understanding by many fellow athletes and even fans.' What is manifest in all these phenomena is simply how 'normal' doing whatever is necessary to win has become, and how thoroughly the language and assumptions of Lombardi ("Winning isn't everything, it's the only thing") have supplanted those of de Coubertin. Professionalism now structures the language and culture of 'high performance' sport, under whatever auspices it is conducted.

These transformations in the culture of the Olympics coincide, of course, with the Olympic movement's embrace of commercial sponsorship, and with the demonstrated drawing power (and hence the commercial value) of elite sport as television entertainment. It has to be acknowledged that without the IOC's skillful organization and control of the commercial potential of the Olympic Games, the Games would likely no longer exist in their current form. The demands of staging a global event of this scope have continued to escalate, and by the 1980s, the costs of the necessary infrastructure had gone beyond what cities and countries could undertake out of public funds. It should also be recognized that it is the revenue from commercial sponsorships that has allowed the IOC to contribute to sport development in the developing countries and to subsidize their participation in the Games themselves, something that many new nations have seen as an important symbol of nationhood. Televison took the Olympics into the furthest comers of the globe; but the Games' contemporary status in global culture is in no small way also a product of the IOC's own efforts to include newly emerging nations in the Olympic 'institution'.

At the same time, though, the presentation of the Games as a global media event has meant significant accommodations with the interests of television networks and sponsors. These include concrete modifications to competition sites, and sometimes cosmetic modifications to cities (exemplified in NBC's reported demands that Sydney get rid of unsightly power lines). They also include scheduling accommodations that are intended to maximize the (commercially most important) North American audiences, sometimes to the inconvenience of the live audiences (e.g., in Asia or Australia) and the athletes themselves. There are also suggestions that the place in the Games programme of sports that do not make "good television" may now be under threat.

More important ideologically, though, is that since media coverage of the Games, like that of professional sport, emphasizes results rather than process (here with the subtext of nationalism), and builds its stories around winners and record breakers rather than people who finish ninth, the public meanings of the Olympics become increasingly indistinguishable from those of professional sport. The power of these media conventions is illustrated in a story Donnelly tells about two Canada - U.S. youth sport exchanges where results are not recorded. Reporters apparently do not know how to

cover sports events without results to build their stories around, with the outcome that meet organizers have had difficulty in finding sponsors because of the lack of media coverage.* Indeed it is precisely the meanings associated with results (more specifically with winning, global competitiveness, and being the best) that most sponsors want to associate themselves with. A 1995 *Time* supplement entitled "Olympic Partnership: How Corporate Sponsors Support the Atlanta Games" is replete with CEOs saying things like "The ideals associated with the Olympics - world class competitiveness and the tireless pursuit of excellence - are parallel to the ideals we have established at Xerox" (P. Allaire, Chairman & CEO, Xerox Corporation). Likewise, when governments encourage their peoples to draw ideological meanings from international sport, it is again lessons about global competitiveness, 'excellence', and the satisfactions of achievement (rather than the joys of play and participation) that they wish to emphasize and sponsor.

Summarizing the above, I want to suggest that globalization, rationalization, and the scientific production of athletic performance have together led to markedly higher standards in many sports - indeed to what we now colloquially call "world class" standards. However the same developments have also led to standardizing tendencies that make it no longer an exaggeration, in my view, to speak of the emergence of a sporting monoculture in which elite high-performance sport increasingly constructs popular meanings and expectations. For participants, these include the standardizing effects - on their bodies, and on their experience of sport - of the training and tactical norms outlined above, and the systematic pursuit of victory that these contribute to. They also include the ideological separation of winners and losers that is popularized by media practices, and has become deeply embedded in both official and popular thinking.

For spectators, meanwhile, 'standards' of what constitutes entertainment have also come to be shaped by the expensive production values that are now part of the staging of "world class" events and shows. These show-business trappings are not necessary conditions of superior athletic performance, yet one effect of their coming to serve as yardsticks against which other events are judged is to make less-well financed productions (often aimed at local rather than global audiences) look amateurish by comparison. Finally, one of the most standard features of any "world class" sports event today is simply the overwhelming presence of corporate advertising, often the same familiar logos for the same set of global brand names. Indeed, a case could be made that it is the pervasive presence of these brand names and logos - on our clothing and our public buildings, as well as in our stadia and on our television screens - that contributes more than anything else to the standardization of contemporary cultural landscapes.

Constructing the Global Consumer

What is emerging, it is suggested, is a global consumer culture in which entertainment plays a significant part, and the same world famous sports events and sports celebrities, like their counterparts in film and popular music, are followed by media audiences around the affluent world. Moreover, new sports products - for example, World Cup competitions in rugby and cricket - are being created precisely with global television in mind. The most successful of these products, of course, from a commercial perspective, will be those that do succeed in attracting global audiences. They will not only sell themselves but, more importantly, they will prove their value as promotional vehicles for other global products. What is noteworthy here is the extent to which both Olympic and professional sport have become incorporated into what Wernick calls "circuits of promotion"[9], in a culture in which the significance of any entertainment event can be precisely calculated according to its capacity to promote the major products and personalities associated with it.

It is also significant that from the perspective of global media like Fox, sports performances are simply entertainment *products,* rather than cultural practices that are organically connected to particular places or people. This, of course, echoes the longstanding position of the American film industry, which has consistently pursued 'free trade' in cultural products, and opposed the efforts of other nations to protect their own cultural traditions from commercial competition. Indeed, revisiting the old debate about whether globalization is a euphemism for the Americanization of world culture, what may be more significant (and certainly more likely, in the long run) than the spread of particular American cultural products - whether NBA basketball or 'The Simpsons' - is the diffusion of precisely this idea that culture can be marketed *as product,* and the business logic that follows from that. This logic is reshaping all of the performance arts, including sport, with predictable effects.

Assessing these effects, it is clear that Canadians (like Australians) now have access to a wider range of sports entertainment than they had in the past, including not only NBA basketball and PGA golf, but events like the World Cup and the Tour de France that were once very difficult to find on Canadian television. Most Canadians would probably regard this as a positive development. However, it is also clear that Canadian sports audiences, like audiences in other countries, are being addressed as free-floating consumers, who would switch teams and even develop new sporting interests if only they had access to "world class" sporting entertainment. Indeed the idea promoted in a great deal of global marketing is that "as people gain access to global information, so they develop global needs and demand global commod-

ities, thereby becoming global citizens."[10] Yet it needs to be recognized that being a global consumer is not the same as being a global citizen, and that the marketing of global products sets out precisely to weaken peoples' loyalties to local products and producers. It does this by seeking to construct at least two kinds of ideological associations.

In the first and most transparent of these, the discourse of "world class" typically seeks to appropriate for the global product the connotations of excellence, and often the idea of being the best in the world. What global products offer - whether the Olympic Games, the NBA, "Phantom of the Opera", or a Rolling Stones concert - is famous names, expensive production values, and shows that are widely promoted as the best of their kind. However a distinction needs to be made here between fame and excellence, especially where the former is always at least partly the product of expensive publicity machines. It is also important to consider how difficult it is to determine the "best", when considering what are often quite different products or institutions. The term "world class" was once meaningfully applied to athletics or swimming performances that were measurably the best in the world in a given year. However, it is now used as a claim to superiority in so many different contexts, ranging from orchestras to cities to universities - contexts where quantitative comparisons are difficult and criteria of excellence remain matters of debate - that it has become a "sign without a referent", emptied of any concrete meaning.[11] It might even be said that it now denotes nothing so clearly as self-promotion, and indeed the status of an aspirant (as opposed to an established) claimant.

In the second of these rhetorical moves, descriptors like "world class" and indeed most of the discourse associated with globalism seek to appropriate the positive connotations of an older discourse of internationalism and attach these meanings (sophistication, collective progress, and idealism about cross-cultural understanding) to the consumption of global products. Inter-nationalism, and the formal and informal institutions that developed in the middle decades of the twentieth century to encourage it - ranging from UNESCO to youth exchange programs and other forms of educational travel - encouraged cross-cultural knowledge and appreciation. Moreover, it typically did so in ways that encouraged people to encounter 'otherness' directly and on its own terms, rather than having it mediated and otherwise made 'accessible'. It placed a positive value on difference, both for its own sake and as a source of learning. This, it has to be said, is profoundly different from the transnational culture advocated by global marketers, in which global events and celebrities and global brand names and products are routinely portrayed as somehow superior to the local. In the discursive shift from internationalism to globalism (or post-nationalism), globally promoted products and lifestyles are often articulated with decontextualized ethnic imagery or with vague support for "human rights" (again stripped of any specific context).[12] The intended effect (not unlike that of so-called 'green marketing') is to position the consumer of global products as sophisticated, even as occupying some kind of moral high ground.

Yet there is absolutely nothing in the wearing of Adidas or Mondetta clothing, for example, or in the consumption of merchandise displaying the five-ringed Olympic logo, that requires any thing but the most superficial knowledge of people in other countries, let alone any commitment to the welfare of people in those countries. In the context of the internationalist project and the discourse that made sense of it, cosmopolitanism or sophistication implied a level of detailed knowledge about cultures different from one's own (often more than one), as well as the kind of cultural capital that enabled one to operate knowledgeably outside the comfort zone of one's 'home' culture. In the context of 'world class' culture and the consumer discourse associated with it, however, cosmopolitanism and sophistication are effectively de-skilled, reduced to being conversant with the meanings and sign values of global entertainment and shopping. Along with this, Hannerz proposes that another effect of the globalization of culture has been to confer connotations of sophistication on commodities associated with the world's metropolitan centres of cultural production, simply "by making their metropolitan derivation a significant part of their value to the consumer." This is achieved at one level by valorizing particular brand names (eg. Hard Rock Cafe, Planet Hollywood, Nike). However, it occurs "also with regard to more diffuse complexes... (notably) the kinds of phenomena nowadays frequently packaged as 'lifestyles'."[13]

Three points are worth drawing out here, in wrapping up this discussion of how consumers are positioned to think about global products, including "world class" sport. The first of these is simply that globalism, as opposed to inter-nationalism, is an agenda determined by corporate, as opposed to public, goals. Globalism is about reshaping patterns of consumption and about 'growing' the markets for the products of major transnational corporations, and it is no accident that the entertainment industry is one of its most powerful and effective carriers.[14] International sport is not new, of course, but today the incorporation of sport into the media and entertainment industries, and thus into corporate circuits of promotion, has steadily supplanted communal meanings with corporate commodity-signs. Secondly, this leads us to note the growing importance of 'sign values' to the market value of more and more commodities: especially, perhaps, cultural commodities. Articulating Levitt's depiction of the global marketer's agenda (above) with Lash & Urry's discussion in *Economies of Signs and Space,* it can be proposed that global marketing is in part the business of making products more valuable precisely by attaching global cultural associations to them.[15] Thirdly, though, picking up Hannerz's point (above) about the marketing of metropolitan lifestyles, it is noteworthy that the kinds of cultural products to which the

label “world class” is most often attached - international sports, metropolitan theatre and opera, touring musicals, and ‘brand name’ hotels - are precisely those expensive tastes that constitute the visible lifestyle of the transnational business and professional classes. This adds to their sign values to an extent that they have become, in turn, important signifiers for the many cities that seek to attract these elites, both as residents and as tourists. Indeed one way of operationally defining “world class” might be to suggest that it now denotes those products (and cities) that seek to cater to the lifestyle interests of the new transnational elites.[16]

Concluding Remarks

Against such a view, I want to cite Northrop Frye’s proposal that “If Toronto is a world class city, it is not because it bids for the Olympics or builds follies like the SkyDome, but because of the tolerated variety of the people in its streets.”[17] Frye makes the argument that Toronto is now made up of a diversity of peoples and cultural practices that would have been unimaginable fifty years ago; and it is this potential for cross-cultural learning, rather than the presence of global consumer opportunities, that gives Toronto whatever cosmopolitan character it now has. In this, Frye echoes what Hannerz also observes about Amsterdam and Stockholm: both cities containing substantial communities of South American, African, and Middle Eastern origins, all of whom reproduce some aspects of the cultures of their homelands at the same time that they (and their children) make new lives in Europe. They are, in their interactions with each other and with the Dutch and Swedish societies which they now call home, *making new culture,* and the host societies are changing too, as a result, in ways that make them (by Frye’s standards, at least) more cosmopolitan and interesting.‘* In contrast to such sources of interest and diversity, the kinds of developments that are typically touted by urban boosters as evidence of “world class” status - major office, shopping, and cultural facilities in the downtown core, the latter featuring world famous brand names in shopping and entertainment, and the periodic hosting of the world at events like Olympics and World Expositions - are precisely developments that have contributed to standardizing the ‘downtown glamour zones’ of major cities around the world. They have also been accompanied, in many places, by an increasing social polarization, between those who work in the globalizing sectors of the economy and have the means to avail themselves of world famous culture, and those who can’t afford world class prices and whose quality of life depends more on the quality of neighbourhood life and the viability of local public services.[19]

This position must be distinguished here from those that hark back nostalgically to the days of homogeneous and stable cultures. These days are gone forever, and it is worth noting, in bidding them farewell, that the national and civic cultures of the 1950s were very much those of the dominant ethnic groups and dominant social classes; they were routinely intolerant of minority cultures and of the public assertion of difference. Today, the once ‘normal’ links between cultures, ‘peoples’, and territory that made for homogeneous national cultures are rendered increasingly problematic, both by transnational communications and by international patterns of migration. In these contemporary circumstances, young people have opportunities to develop cultural interests and identifications that are not limited either by place or by tradition in the ways that their parents were. The kinds of ‘imagined communities’ they can identify with and participate in are vastly different as a result, and they are under no obligation either to perpetuate the cultural practices of their parents or to uncritically adopt the culture of their new lands. It is more likely, indeed, that out of the mingling of formerly separate cultures as they share the same civic spaces - including schools and universities, public sports and recreational facilities, and public commercial spaces, as well as residential neighbourhoods - new cultural practices and hybrid identities will emerge.[20]

Equally, one must also be aware of the difficulties of demonizing commercial culture. It was commercial entertainment that helped to establish places in the national cultures of the early twentieth century for popular practices, including sports and ‘ethnic’ music, that were often disdained by national elites. Today, moreover, the cultural practices and symbols from which young people construct their identities so often involve consumer choices as to make a reflex opposition to the commercial hopelessly out of step with the times. Market and lifestyle choices, and the kinds of elective affinities they enable us to embody and display, have become central to the modern (and postmodern) construction of identity.[21] At the same time, it remains legitimate to oppose what Herbert Schiller has called the corporate takeover of public expression,[21] and in particular, its appropriation of our popular discourses of idealism and human possibility. The former matters because it pushes to the margins of *public* culture all those cultural forms, including the sports of minority cultures, that are not of interest to corporate sponsors simply because the audiences for them are too small, too regional, or not affluent enough. The latter matters because even though consumer choices are today one of the ways in which we define ourselves and recognize affinities in others, media celebration of consumer sovereignty can obscure the almost non-person status of the increasing population, both within the ‘developed’ countries and outside them, who are effectively excluded from citizenship in the consumer society. [23] Finally, it matters because although the liberalization of market forces associated with

globalization has created unprecedented lifestyle opportunities for those with money, if our primary public languages (and images) for dreaming become the market's languages of competitive achievement and consumerism, this cannot help but construct both our personal dreams and our collective ideas about human possibility along increasingly individualistic lines. This is the antithesis, it is suggested, of the original internationalist project, of which Olympism was once a part.

If hegemonies are sustained by occupying the spaces that might otherwise be available for alternative meanings and practices, what is underscored here is the importance of counter-hegemonic policies or interventions that could assist cultural diversity. In sport, this could mean support for keeping alive traditional games that are part of cultures now being modernized and westernized, or support for athletic activities that could serve as countercultural alternatives to the 'high-performance' model and ideology. Examples of the former include the games of Native Canadians and other indigenous peoples, as well as regional traditions like rodeo or Highland Games.[24] Examples of the latter could include unorganized activities like skateboarding or hackysack, as well as organized events like the Gay Games and many others where high performance is less important than communal celebrations of shared identities. Most of these events and practices include women as well as men, and encompass a fairly wide age range (ie., they are not limited to elite athletes).

Crucially, though, Hannerz points out that in Holland and Sweden, the state has given institutional supports (and public funding) to cultural initiatives of minorities *that the market would be unlikely to support;* indeed Canada and Australia have done likewise, in accordance with policies supporting multiculturalism. Yet this support for diversity has not been part of our *sport* policies. We have encouraged minority individuals to succeed in high-performance sports, and have held up individuals who have succeeded as examples of our meritocractic societies. However, Sport Canada has regularly refused funding to First Nations sporting festivals that feature traditional games rather than Olympic sports. It also requires that any sports association seeking funding produce a four year plan geared towards high performance and success in international events, thus ruling out culturally distinctive sports almost by definition. This reflects, of course, the "presupposed system goals" of institutions like Sport Canada and the Australian Institute of Sport. Yet if the object of cultural policy studies is to uncover the ways in which governments fund and use culture to pursue particular social objectives, it seems fair to observe that in the case of sport policy, the Canadian state is reinforcing the market's tendencies towards globalization and high performance, rather than supporting alternatives.

These remarks on the actual and potential roles of government lead to some final comments on the meaning of global citizenship. Levitt, in the passage cited above, suggests that global citizenship is a product of participation (however mediated) in global events and consumption of global products. Much of the discourse of global culture, indeed, like the allied discourse of lifestyle, invites us to think of the world in terms of consumer opportunities, with the best places (whether nations or cities) that offer the fullest range of "world class" entertainment and shopping.[25] It is no accident, moreover, that both discourses are addressed primarily at those individuals who can afford expensive lifestyles, and are in a position to move about the world to those places best able to cater to their interests and needs. The lyrics of consumer sovereignty and global citizenship are, it is argued here, harmonies in the same siren song, a song that promotes what Raymond Williams shortly before his death called "mobile privatisation" in which global consumer and lifestyle opportunities coexist with a "radically reduced" understanding of citizenship, and a decrease in commitment to any common good.[26]

More recently, former U.S. Secretary of Labour Robert Reich has also expressed concern that among the new transnational elites, the discourses of global citizenship no longer express much sense of connection with - let alone responsibility for - those who will never have opportunities for world class lifestyles: "the new global sources of their economic well-being have subtly altered how they understand their economic roles and responsibilities in society".[27] Reich's concern here is the lack of any of the interest in collective fate (let alone responsibilities to the community) that used to be associated with the concept of citizenship. Therefore, even as intellectuals (surely one kind of transnational elite, though not the most affluent) acknowledge the appeal that "world class" attractions may often have for us as individuals, we need to rearticulate the distinctions between citizen and consumer identities in the contemporary global economy, and to make these the subject of broader public debate.

Endnotes

1. Charles Euchner, *Playing the Field: Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992; Andrew Wemick, *Promotional Culture,* London: Sage, 1991.

2. Peter Donnelly, "Prolympism: Sport Monoculture as Crisis and Opportunity", *Quest, 48,* 1996, pp. 25-42.

3. John Hoberman, *Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport,* New York: The Free Press. 1992.

4. Eduardo Galeano, *Soccer in the Sun and Shadow,* London: Verso, 1998, p. 171.

5. Canada, *Toward 2000,* Ottawa: Fitness and Amateur Sport, 1988, pp. 26, 36.

6. Jurgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society,* London: Heinemann, 1971, pp. 112-115.

7. Swiss cycling star Alex Zulle is reported to have told police who questioned him after drugs were discovered in a Festina team car during the 1998 Tour de France that performance enhancing drugs were simply "part of the business" of being a top racer. Fans, moreover, are reported to have supported the Festina riders and opposed their dis-*missal* from the race. "Ethics not an option in le grand tour de farce," *Sydney Morning Herald,* July 27, 1998.

8. Donnelly, "Prolympism...", p. 33.

9. Wernick, *Promotional Culture.*

10. Theodore Levitt, *The Marketing Imagination,* London: Collier Macmillan, 1983, cited in Kevin Robins, "Tradition and Translation: National Cultures in a Global Context", J. Comer & S. Harvey (eds.), *Enterprise and Heritage: Crosscurrents of National Culture,* Routledge, 1991, pp. 26-27.

11. John Hartley, "A State of excitement: Eastern Australia and the America's Cup", *Cultural Studies,* 2(1), pp. 117-126.

12. Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity,* London: Penguin, 1991. See also the discussions in Ulf Hannetz, *Transnational Connections,* London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 82-83, 102-104.

13. Hannertz, *Transnational Connections,* p. 156.

14. Brian Fawcett, "The trouble with globalism", in M. Wyman (ed.) *Vancouver Forum,* Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1992, pp. 183-201.

15. Scott Lash & John Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space,* London: Sage, 1994.

16. Hannerz, *Transnational Connections,* pp. 131-132, See also Saskia Sassen, *The Global City,* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, D. Whitson & D. Macintosh, "The global circus: International sport, tourism, and the marketing of cities", *Journal of Sport and Social Issues,* 20, pp. 278-295.

17. Northrop Frye, "The cultural development of Canada", *Australian-Canadian Studies,* 10(l), 1992, p. 16.

18. Hannerz, *Transnational Connections,* ch. 12, 13.

19. See Saskia Sassen, *Cities in a World Economy,* Thousand Oaks CA: Pine Forge/Sage Press, 1994; Dave Harvey, 'Flexible accumulation through urbanization: Reflections on post-modernism in the American city", *Antipode, 19,* pp. 260-286.

20. Hannertz, *Transnational Connections,* p. 24-25.

21. Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-identity,* Cambridge Polity Press, 1991. Douglas Kellner, "Popular culture and the construction of postmodern identities", in S. Lash & J. Friedman (eds.), *Modernity & Identity,* Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.

22. Herbert Schiller, *Culture Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression,* NY: Oxford, 1989.

23. Saskia Sassen, ‘Whose city is it? Globalization and the formation of new claims”, *Public Culture,* 8, 1996, pp. 205-223.

24. On keeping alive indigenous games, see M. Heine & K. Young, “Colliding identities in Arctic Canadian Sports and Games” *Sociological Focus,* 4, 1997, 357-372.

25. Roy Turner, “Modernity and cultural identity: Is there an alternative to the ‘loose coalition of shopping malls’?‘, *Canadian Issues, 12,* 1990, pp. 97-108. See also Whitson & Macintosh, ‘The global circus...“, op cit.

26. Raymond Williams, *Towards 2000.* London: Penguin, 1987.

27. Robert. Reich, *The Work of Nations,* NY: Knopf, 1991, p. 252. See discussion in Hannerz, p. 84-85.